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This paper provides an analysis of the impact of extraordinary climate shocks
on the incidence of civil conflict using cross-country panel data from Africa and
the Middle East (1981 to 2015). We find that: (i) The estimated impact of
climate shocks (mainly temperature effect) on economic growth rate and domes-
tic food production ranges from 3 to 5% compared to the estimated impact of
temperature growth 47%. (ii) We identified a direct impact of climate shocks
on the incidence of civil conflict, where this impact is similar in magnitude to
the negative impact of rainfall growth on conflict (3-4%). (iii) We confirmed the
negative link between conflict and both economic indicators, conflict begets next
conflict, the positive impact of good governance and polity IV estimates, and
the freshwater availability on reducing the risk of conflict. Concluding that the
main effect of climate comes from the temperature growth effects and it is not
extreme shocks that drive economic declines, which indicates that the climate
rather operates in a non-linear process.
Keywords: Climate shocks, civil conflict, economic development
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1 Introduction
Scientists have provided evidence that climate change negatively affects economies and
people, and significantly contributes to their involvement in disasters and armed conflict.
In a previous part of this research, we have proved existing findings in the literature
(e.g., Miguel et al. (2004)), that climate variation1 has a significant impact on economic
performance and the incidence of civil conflict. We have confirmed empirically (like Dell et
al. (2012)) that higher temperatures contribute to climate variability more than decreased
precipitation. Our data shows that a one percentage point change in the year-to-year
temperature averages lead to a 0.31 pp reduction in economic growth rate and 0.23 pp
in food production over the period 1981-2015. According to the estimated impact of
temperature on economic indicators, some countries that currently have annual income
growth of 1 to 1.4%, in the next 32 years, will not be able to achieve any income growth
due to temperature changes. The sustained increase in temperatures shows devastating
effects on cross-country economic performance over time. Dell et al. (2012) observed for
each 1 Celsius degree increase in temperature a decline in per capita income of about 8
percent. We have identified a direct impact of climate through rainfall growth on the risk
of civil conflict. Additionally, we confirmed the most robust finding in the literature that
economic growth rate (Miguel et al., 2004) and domestic food production are negatively
related to the incidence of civil conflict. However, estimating the impact of climate change
using annual percentage change of rainfall and temperature following the method of some
highly recognized studies in the literature (the previously mentioned study of Miguel et
al. (2004)) has been criticized, for instance, by Ciccone (2011).
Using the annual percentage change of precipitation does not provide sufficient informa-
tion about whether a wet year is a year with heavy rainfall, or just a wetter year than the
previous one (mean reversion). To address this valid criticism, in this paper, we perform a
more fine-grained analysis and focus instead on the effects of a true climate shock, which
we identify at different levels of deviations from the long-term mean of climate variables.
Moreover, to better capture the effect of occurred shocks, we define in which direction
constructed shocks deviate from their respective historical long-term mean. The impor-
tance of taking into account precipitation deviations that may affect in both directions
when estimating the impact of climate shocks is also emphasized by Papaioannou and
deHaas (2015).
We suppose that positive or negative extreme climate shocks, lead to higher levels of
conflict incidence, either directly or through economic reductions. Therefore, in this paper,
our main aim is to estimate the effect of medium and extreme climate shocks compared
to annual relative changes in weather variables from the previous year in selected model
specifications.
1The relative change from previous year in rainfall and temperature variables
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In the following section, we introduce data and methods. In section 3, we present empirical
results. Section 4 discusses results and conclusions.
2 Data and methods
2.1 Data and measurement strategies
For estimates, we use our new cross-country panel data including 59 countries from Africa
and the Middle East for 1981 to 2015, which contains data on conflict, climate, economic,
political, and environmental variables.
1. Climate variables
Data on annual average temperature (Celsius degree) and rainfall levels (millimeter)
come from World Bank Climate Change Knowledge Portal (2018). We use different
measurements for climate change as follows:
To observe relative change from previous year in rainfall and temperature variables,
we follow Miguel et al. (2004):
gr_var(it) =var(it)−var_lag1
var_lag1 .
To construct shock variables, we derive annual climate deviation variables from
their long-term mean in each country over the period 1981-2015 divided by standard
deviation from their respective mean over 35 years, using the following formula:
dev.Xit = (Xi, t− X̄i)/σi
Where X it is the annual rainfall or temperature in country i time t, and X̄i denotes
to the historical long-term mean of each country, and σi is the standard deviation
of each country long-term respective mean. The temperature deviation data ranges
from -3.03 to 3.18, deviation has a mean of 0.03, and a standard deviation of 0.98.
While normalized annual rainfall data ranges from -2.69 to 3.76 and has a mean of
almost zero and a standard deviation of 0.99.
1. To consider that there is a shock in the constructed deviation variables, we define
the direction of deviation (positive or negative) and classify two shock thresholds (1
indicates medium shock and 2 extreme shocks). Accordingly, the value of climate
shock variables in-country (i) and time (t): ranging from -2 to +2, take four values:
those greater than 1 and less than -1, greater than 2 and less than -2 excluding
the effect of observations outside these thresholds. The separation of the effects of
positive and negative shocks is thought to further explain existing relationships.
2. Furthermore, we include the impact of observed shocks over lagged two to five
previous years to better understand the dynamics of shocks on economic conditions
and conflict risk (see the summary table of variables).
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Data on other climate variables: water indicators come from FAO (2017),
which are available for five-year periods from the 1980s for most countries of our
sample. Including water stress indicator which is known as water withdrawal inten-
sity. water_1km2 is the average annual level of freshwater withdrawal (calculated
averagely over each decade) divided by country area as:
water_1km2= 106 x wasser_total/area.km2, in 103 m3/km2.
For more information see the summary of variables in Appendix A5.
2. Economic development indicators
(i) Gross Domestic Product per capita estimates in constant price-US dollars(UNSD,
2020) 2. We estimate the growth effect of GDP per capita observing changes from
previous year (gr_gdp_c_con(it) =gdp_c_conit−gdp_c_con_lagit
gdp_c_con_lagit ).
(ii) Food production index represents the aggregate volume of agricultural produc-
tion for each year compared to the base period 2004-2006, covers food crops that
are considered edible, and contains nutrients. Coffee and tea are excluded because,
although edible, they have no nutritive value, from the Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations (2016).
(iii)Time series of oil exporter status (% of merchandise exports) (World Bank,
2016).
(iv) Total merchandise trade of a country exports to the world in US dollar at
current prices from the The World Trade Organization (2016).
3. Conflict data
For the conflict incidence indicator, which subsumes outbreak of a conflict and
continuation of a conflict that results in at least 25 battle-related deaths each year,
we use the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, a conflict version 18.1. (Themnér
et al., 2018)3
4. Political Indicators
We include the impact of political regime type (Polity IV) on the incidence of civil
war. (i) Polity IV scores for each country on a range from -10 (full autocracy) to
+10 (full democracy). Regimes that fall into the middle of this spectrum are called
2UNSD (2020) make available a complete and consistent set of GDP per capita time series, from 1970
onwards of the main National Accounts aggregates of all UN Members States and other territories in
the world for which National Accounts information is available, GDP per capita estimates expressed
either in current or constant price-US dollars. http://data.un.org/
3The UCDP/PRIO armed conflict, developed by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) at the
Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University in Sweden and the International
Peace Research Institute in Oslo, (PRIO) for download: http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/.
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anocracies. The source is the project of Roser (2019), based on Polity IV Project
(2013) and Wimmer and Min (2006). We transformed these scores to be instead on
a range from 1 to 20 for easier interpretation of coefficients. (ii) Second, we include
the impact of transition or stability in the political system "strength_gr_polityiv"
by observing changes in absolute terms from the previous year in Polity IV scores
when there is a shift in the regime either toward democracy or backward to the
autocracy (strength_gr_polityiv= polityiv_sh_tr - polityiv_sh_tr_lag_1 ).
(iii) Voice and accountability indicator: percentile rank among all countries (ranges
from 0=lowest to 100 = highest), reflects perceptions of the extent to which a
country’s citizens can participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom
of expression, freedom of association, and a free media. The source is World Bank
(2014).
5. Other country characteristics
Such as agricultural land (% of land area) refer to the share of land area that is arable
as defined by the FAO, under permanent crops and pastures. Land abandoned as a
result of shifting cultivation is excluded. Arable land (hectares per person) (World
Bank, 2016). Population (World Bank, 2018).
2.2 Methods
We examine the relationship between climate change (annual climate variations and
shocks, water stress, and water availability) and the risk of civil conflict, either indirect
through economic development applying instrumental variable approach like by Miguel
et al. (2004); Ciccone (2011) or directly. The impact of climate change in country i and
time t on economic growth rate (Miguel et al., 2004) and on the food index (Buhaug et
al., 2015) is first estimated applying Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) equations number
(1) and (2) using rainfall and temperature variables (growth and shock effects) as instru-
ments with other controls related to economy and conflict. We include in all regressions
country-fixed effects to capture time-invariant country characteristics that may be related
to conflict and we include country-specific time trends to capture additional variation.
The first-stage equations (1) and (2) estimate the relationship between economic develop-
ment (economic growth rate and Food Index), and weather conditions with other controls,
with a vector X ′it of instruments as follow:
gr_gdpit = ai + bX ′it + diyeart + eit, (1)
food_indexit = ai + bX ′it + diyeart + eit, (2)
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country fixed effects aji and country-specific time trends yeart, to capture time-invariant
country characteristics and additional variation over time, respectively. The error term e
is allowed to be correlated across years for the same country in all regressions.
In the second step model, we use Dynamic Panel Data estimators (DPD) based on GMM
estimator to estimate the effect of economic outputs from the first stage on the incidence
of civil conflict together with other climate and political variables. We consider the impact
of lagged conflict as an explanatory variable on the incidence of civil conflict since the
impact of any shock on conflict may differ depending on whether the country is already
experiencing conflict. In equation (3) we estimate our model with DPD based on GMM
as introduced by Hansen (1982) and implemented by Roodman (2009) in the STATA-
package xtabond2. This estimator allows the inclusion of lagged dependent variables
(Roodman; 2009; Arellano and Bover; 1995; Blundell and Bond; 1995). To ensure that
the estimator is robust to heteroskedasticity, we use the option robust on the command
xtabond2.
conflictit = αi + β · gr_gdpit + γ · food_indexit + δ ·X ′it + σi · yeart + εit. (3)
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3 Empirical Results
In the model specification (presented in Table 1) which includes the impact of positive
and negative shock thresholds of climate deviation variables over time, the first stage OLS
(regression 1 and 2) show climate change impacts on economic growth rate and domestic
food production. The effect of rainfall on economic growth rate is significant only through
negative medium shocks (estimated coefficient: 3.9%). Whereas the effect of temperature,
both positive and negative temperature shocks, is significantly correlated with the GDP
growth rate (coefficients 3-5%). However, a greater impact is observed through growth
temperature in year t (coefficient estimate of 47%). Additionally, our model yields other
statistically significant coefficients for economic growth rate, positive on total trade ex-
ports, the share of agricultural land, and negative on political transition indicator. These
correlations are consistent in the significance level among different econometric specifica-
tions. Domestic food production is affected significantly positively only by the impact of
negative medium shock in temperature (coefficient estimate of 3.5%) and negatively by
water stress with a coefficient of 0.07%.
In the second stage model, we assess the impact of linearly estimated economic outcomes
from the first stage regressions adding various control variables on conflict (Column 3
of Table 1) applying GMM. The findings are straightforward and confirm (i) Negative
relationships between both economic indicators, economic growth rate and domestic food
production index, and conflict. (ii) The previous conflict begets the next conflicts. (iii)
A direct impact of climate on conflict. Besides, the model yields expected negative and
significant signs of control variables; freshwater withdrawal, Polity IV, and accountability
on conflict. These control variables show consistent and significant signs with the incidence
of conflict in all tested econometric specifications. Out of all included climate variables,
growth in rainfall shows a consistent and significantly negative impact on the incidence of
civil conflict in all tested model specifications for this research. Regarding climate shock
effects presented in column 3 of Table 1, medium positive rainfall shocks show significant
positive effects on the incidence of civil conflict, whereas medium positive temperature
shocks show negative effects on the incidence of civil conflict.
In a similar model specification (results are reported in table 4 in the appendix), we
control for the impact of lagged year-to-year temperature and rainfall variables to test
whether a change in weather this year has an impact on the food production and economic
growth rate next year (as by many, e.g., Miguel et al. (2004); Ciccone (2011)), and whether
the inclusion of lagged growth effects changes type of already existing relationships. The
model yields a significant impact also for lagged growth temperature on the GDP growth
rate, but the size of the coefficient of growth temperature in time (t) remains greater, and
all other relationships remain consistent in statistical significance.
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Table 1: Annual climate shocks impact. Dependent variables: Economic growth rate,
Food Index in the OLS, and Civil Conflict ≥ 25 Deaths/ year in the GMM
(1) (2) (3)
GR_gdp_c_con food_index any_prio
GR_oil_exp_wdi 0.00000119 (0.623) -0.00000210 (0.289)
GR_trade_exports 0.111*** (0.000) -0.0148** (0.027)
agri_land 0.00387* (0.058) 0.0142*** (0.000)
arable_land -0.264* (0.070) 0.465*** (0.000)
water_stress -0.0000112 (0.914) -0.000735*** (0.000)
strength_gr_polityiv -0.00673*** (0.001) -0.00245 (0.147)
GR_temp -0.470** (0.004) -0.0618 (0.645) 0.185 (0.489)
GR_rainfall -0.0167 (0.121) -0.00621 (0.483) -0.0332** (0.020)
water_1km2 0.0000927 (0.931) -0.000334 (0.704) -0.00613** (0.003)
Polity.IV_SH_tr -0.000206 (0.879) -0.00838*** (0.000) -0.00553** (0.048)
Accountab 0.000670 (0.422) 0.000584 (0.393) -0.00363** (0.026)
urban_pop -0.00175 (0.460) 0.00483** (0.013) 0.00815 (0.142)
rain_dev_Threshold=1 0.0396*** (0.000) 0.000803 (0.926) 0.0420** (0.032)
rain_dev_Threshold=2 0.0000782 (0.997) 0.0244 (0.178) -0.000206 (0.996)
rain_dev_Threshold=3 -0.0110 (0.285) -0.0168** (0.046) 0.0202 (0.297)
rain_dev_Threshold=4 -0.0230 (0.360) 0.000765 (0.970) -0.0317 (0.550)
temp_dev_Threshold=1 -0.0138 (0.198) -0.00439 (0.618) -0.0349** (0.049)
temp_dev_Threshold=2 0.0481* (0.064) -0.00317 (0.881) -0.0587 (0.205)
temp_dev_Threshold=3 -0.0256** (0.018) 0.0315*** (0.000) -0.0177 (0.458)





FE and time effects yes yes yes
Constant -0.173 (0.213) -0.392*** (0.001) 1.084 (0.139)
Observations 1994 1994 1871
Adj R-squared 0.11 0.86
F 2.845 91.13
AIC -2005.221 -2798.827 -5028.188
p-values in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
We now turn to study whether the impact of climate shocks is more severe on economic
development and the incidence of civil conflict when in a country the number of positive or
negative climate shocks observed over the past two to five years in a row (number of shocks
in the past) is higher. For this purpose, the results of the econometric specification that
include the effects of the number of shocks in the previous period on the central variables
and the civil conflict in time t are presented in Table 2. The clear evidence is that climate
affects economic development through temperature; the OLS regressions show that each 1
Celsius degree change in growth temperature reduces 28,8% of economic growth rate and
36% of domestic food production. Even for shock variables, the dominant effect comes
from temperature shocks, where the number of negative temperature shocks observed over
the previous two years shows a significant impact on the economic growth rate and the food
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index, 2.9% and 4.9%, respectively. However, the effect of temperature shocks is again
less in magnitude than the growth effect. For the GMM model 3, we find that results are
broadly consistent in statistical significance with displayed results in Table 5, except for
the effect of rainfall. The direct impact of rainfall on the incidence of civil conflict instead
depends on the number of negative rainfall shocks that occurred in the previous two years
in country i time t. We also have tested this model specification including the occurred
positive or negative climate shocks over the previous 5 years period (Table 5 in Appendix
A5). All established linkages survived. The consistent conclusion for the impact of the
number of climate shocks is that negative and positive rainfall shocks in those countries
which experienced four, and five years of shocks, respectively, show negative significant
coefficients on the incidence of civil conflict. However, it remains difficult to explain the
sign and the significance of all these effects, because the total effect is distributed.
Overall, although the estimates of the first paper and the present one are based on
different model specifications, mainly different measures of climate change, the results are
largely compatible with each other. Our empirical analysis links an increase in temper-
ature and growth in rainfall, with a lower economic growth rate and incidence of civil
conflict, respectively, consistent almost to the inclusion of all model specifications and in
the significance level.
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Table 2: Impact of Observed climate shocks over previous two years on economic devel-
opment in the OLS, and civil conflict ≥ 25 deaths/ year in the GMM
(1) (2) (3)
GR_gdp_c_con food_index any_prio
GR_oil_exp_wdi 0.00000102 (0.663) -0.00000183 (0.349)
GR_trade_exports 0.111*** (0.000) -0.0107 (0.110)
agri_land 0.00447** (0.030) 0.0152*** (0.000)
arable_land -0.240 (0.108) 0.345** (0.006)
water_stress -0.0000150 (0.884) -0.000753*** (0.000)
strength_gr_polityiv -0.00638** (0.002) -0.000473 (0.780)
GR_temp -0.288* (0.061) -0.362** (0.005) 0.0638 (0.806)
GR_rainfall -0.00216 (0.838) 0.00191 (0.828) -0.0155 (0.265)
water_1km2 -0.000221 (0.835) -0.000912 (0.300) -0.00577** (0.005)
Polity.IV_SH_tr -0.00107 (0.441) -0.00985*** (0.000) -0.00519* (0.059)
Accountab 0.000528 (0.519) 0.000836 (0.220) -0.00374** (0.021)
urban_pop -0.00308 (0.241) 0.00621** (0.004) 0.00877 (0.102)
count_T_neg_shock -0.0294** (0.035) 0.0495*** (0.000) -0.00208 (0.943)
count_T_pos_shock 0.0132 (0.358) 0.00112 (0.926) 0.00240 (0.908)
count_R_neg_shock -0.000555 (0.969) 0.0190 (0.110) -0.0492* (0.059)





FE and time effects yes yes yes
Constant 0.265 (0.457) 0.427 (0.150) 0.106 (0.199)
Observations 1871 1871 1871
Adj R-squared 0.11 0.86
F 2.840 87.42
AIC -1986.234 -2674.556 -5036.188
R reefer to rainfall and T to temperature. p-values in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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4 Discussion and conclusion
This study has examined the linkage between climate shocks and the incidence of conflict
using a new cross-country panel data for 59 countries of Africa and the Middle East from
1981 to 2015. For the estimates, we applied two alternative econometric specifications,
which include the effect of: (i) Extreme and medium climate shocks in both directions:
positive and negative deviations. (ii) The number of observed shocks over lagged two
years. The findings are: (1) the highly pronounced positive correlation between growth in
rainfall and economic growth rate in the literature (e.g. by Miguel et al. (2004); Barrios
et al. (2010)) is confirmed with our model through positive rainfall shock "medium shock:
one deviation point". However, when the shock in rainfall becomes extreme (over two
deviation points), that may lead to severe flooding, it shows an expectedly negative sign
with economic growth rate although insignificant. Quantitatively, the estimated effect
of rainfall shock on the economic growth rate is greater compared to what we observe
through interaction effects in our first paper, 3.9% and 0.02%, respectively. None of the
rainfall variables, neither the growth nor the shock variables, show a significant impact on
food production. (2) Temperature shocks, both positive and negative, are also related to
the GDP growth rate significantly. However, a greater effect is observed for the temper-
ature growth (estimated coefficients between 0.47 pp and 0.69 pp in the model with lags,
compared to 0.31 pp in our first paper). The negative deviation in temperature shows a
significant positive effect on the food index. Furthermore, we see that the negative impact
of temperature shock on economic growth rate is explained by the significant impact of
the observed negative temperature shocks in the previous two years, where this indicator
variable shows a similar positive impact on the food index. Overall, the main effect of
climate comes from the temperature growth and it is not extreme shocks that drive eco-
nomic declines, which indicates that the climate rather operates in a non-linear process.
The pattern we find in our first paper remains the same, that temperature growth con-
tributes to the climate impacts more than rainfall impacts.
3) Regarding the direct effects of climate shocks on the incidence of civil conflict, we find
that: the medium positive rainfall shock increases the incidence of civil conflict signifi-
cantly, whereas extreme deviations (two deviation points) have no effect. Our finding is
consistent in part with the result of Papaioannou and deHaas (2015); Burke et al. (2015)
who found that rainfall deviation increases conflict significantly, and with Papaioannou
and deHaas (2015) who indicated that both drought and excessive rainfall have increased
scarcity and created conditions that generated social tension and distress. However, it
counters the finding of Fjelde and von Uexkull (2012) that large negative deviations in
rainfall from the long-term mean are related to a higher risk of conflict. One explanation
could be that 55.6% of our sample is considered as low-rainfall countries, therefore, higher
rainfall leads to floods, thus destroying natural resources or losing livelihoods associated
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with agriculture, thus increasing the likelihood of conflict. On the other hand, the impact
of positive temperature shock (medium shock) on the risk of civil conflict is significantly
negative. Annual rainfall growth is related negatively to the incidence of civil conflict
similar to the consistent result of another part of this research and like in the literature
(Hendrix and Glaser, 2007; Bohlken and Sergenti, 2010). The occurrence of two negative
rain shocks in succession reduces conflict risk significantly, but in this context, the signif-
icant impact of rainfall growth on civil conflict disappears and appears instead on rainfall
shocks. However, it is difficult to find an explanation for each individual effect that we
observed for the indicator variables (shocks) because in any case, they do not show the
overall effect of precipitation and temperature. In the literature it has been suggested by
Tietenberg (2000); Baechler (2013) that an unexpected decrease in freshwater availability
increases competition for access to water and land and that harvest failure that lead to
food shortages increase the likelihood of civil conflict.
However, the direct effect of continuous and shock climate variables on the incidence of
civil conflict in this paper is quantitatively similar and corresponds to the effect of rainfall
growth on the decrease of the probability of civil conflict in the best fit model (3) table
2.3 in a previous paper4 . The marginal impact of climate shocks on economic indicators
and civil conflicts does not exceed 5%.
(4) Furthermore, the established links between economic development, domestic food
production, and the incidence of civil conflict with our data remain, almost the same
quantitatively. Where a 10% reduction in economic growth or domestic food production
leads to up to 1.44% and 1.6 increase in the probability of civil conflict, respectively. (5)
In addition, the model observed negative and significant signs of control variables; Fresh-
water withdrawal, Polity IV, and accountability, all contribute to reducing the potential
for conflict. While the exogenous variables such as the transition in a political system, the
share of agricultural lands, and the increase in trade exports are critical factors for the
economic growth rate and water stress is a critical factor for domestic food production.
Overall, precipitation, and temperature shocks are statistically significant but quantita-
tively show smaller effects relative to growth effect, i.e. temperature growth has larger
impact on economic growth rate, but positive rainfall shock also plays a role. Thus, the
effect of climate on conflict seems to be non-linear. Performing such a fine-grained anal-
ysis benefits the literature in this field, especially as our data extends over a longer time
(1981-2015) and covers two regions that are vulnerable to climate change in the world. By
providing new indicators describing climate change and achieving a better understanding
of the links between climate deviations and conflict, we bring a different perspective to
the effects of climate on economic growth rate, food production, and conflict in Africa
and the Middle East.
4If Climate Change Can Trigger Civil Conflicts, Can Good Economic Policy Trigger Peace. By S.
Khalifa, S. Petri, Ch. Henning, 2020.
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adding up all the monthly









(Celsius degree) are com-
puted by adding up all the
monthly observations in a
given year divided by the













variables from their long-
term mean in each country
over the period 1981-2015
divided by standard devi-
ation from their respective



















1 and 2) over last










-1 and -2) over last
2 or 5 years period
"count_R/T_neg_shock"
Water/ 1Km2 Average annual level of
freshwater withdrawal (cal-
culated averagely over each
decade) divided by country




Water stress% Freshwater withdrawal as
a proportion of available
freshwater resources. This
indicator is also known as
water withdrawal intensity
and will measure progress




1. PolityIV score Type of political regime for
each country on a range








2. Change in po-
litical system
Indicates changes from the
previous year in absolute
terms of Polity IV scores ei-
ther toward democracy or
backward to autocracy.
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The share of land area
that is arable as defined by
the FAO, under permanent
crops, and under permanent
pastures. Land abandoned
as a result of shifting culti-
vation is excluded.
World Bank (2016)
2. Arable land Arable land (hectares per
person).
Demographic
The share of ur-
ban population













Total merchandise trade of
a country exports to the










GDP per capita estimates in
constant price-US dollars.
The UNSD (2020) .
2. Food index The aggregate volume of
agricultural production for
each year compared to the
base period 2004-2006, cov-
ers food crops that are con-
sidered edible and that con-
tain nutrients. Coffee and







Lag civil conflict conflict incidence resulted at
least 25 battel related death






5All country-year observations are coded as ones based on the type (3 and 4) and the intensity level 1
or 2 of the PRIO Uppsala conflict data (at least 25 battle-related deaths per year), otherwise zeros.
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Table 4: Annal climate shocks impact. Dependent Variables: Economic growth rate, food
index in the OLS, and civil conflict ≥ 25 Deaths/ year in the GMM
(1) (2) (3)
GR_gdp_c_con food_index any_prio
GR_oil_exp_wdi 0.00000114 (0.639) -0.00000213 (0.283)
GR_trade_exports 0.114*** (0.000) -0.0142** (0.033)
agri_land 0.00395 * (0.053) 0.0142*** (0.000)
arable_land -0.272 * (0.063) 0.469*** (0.000)
water_stress -0.0000140 (0.892) -0.000734*** (0.000)
strength_gr_polityiv -0.00677*** (0.001) -0.00254 (0.132)
GR_temp_lag_1 -0.0139 (0.922) 0.0203 (0.860) 0.0777 (0.705)
GR_rainfall_lag_1 0.000624 (0.773) -0.00375** (0.034) 0.00996 (0.340)
water_1km2 -0.0000189 (0.986) -0.000324 (0.712) -0.00608** (0.003)
Polity.IV_SH_tr -0.000355 (0.794) -0.00838*** (0.000) -0.00547* (0.051)
Accountab 0.000683 (0.414) 0.000584 (0.392) -0.00367** (0.024)
urban_pop -0.00190 (0.422) 0.00487** (0.012) 0.00795 (0.153)
rain_dev_Threshold=1 0.0368*** (0.000) -0.00117 (0.889) 0.0329* (0.089)
rain_dev_Threshold=2 -0.00369 (0.862) 0.0209 (0.227) -0.0189 (0.661)
rain_dev_Threshold=3 -0.00668 (0.498) -0.0157* (0.051) 0.0296 (0.101)
rain_dev_Threshold=4 -0.0186 (0.454) 0.00229 (0.910) -0.0191 (0.709)
temp_dev_Threshold=1 -0.0227** (0.027) -0.00528 (0.529) -0.0306 * (0.078)
temp_dev_Threshold=2 0.0305 (0.224) -0.00396 (0.847) -0.0505 (0.245)
temp_dev_Threshold=3 -0.0173* (0.100) 0.0334*** (0.000) -0.0199 (0.388)





FE and time effects yes yes yes
Constant -0.176 (0.205) -0.394*** (0.001) 1.081 (0.145)
Observations 1994 1994 1871
Adj R-squared 0.11 0.85
F 2.759 91.35
AIC -1994.861 -2803.037 -5028.899
p-values in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 5: Climate shocks over a previous 5-year period and economic development in the
OLS, and civil conflict ≥ 25 deaths/ year in the GMM
(1) (2) (3)
GR_gdp_c_con food_index any_prio
GR_oil_exp_wdi 0.000000637 (0.785) -0.00000128 (0.507)
GR_trade_exports 0.117*** (0.000) -0.0115* (0.098)
agri_land 0.00441** (0.050) 0.0156*** (0.000)
arable_land -0.105 (0.515) 0.275** (0.040)
water_stress 0.0000167 (0.878) -0.000767*** (0.000)
strength_gr_polityiv -0.00709*** (0.001) 0.000904 (0.608)
GR_temp -0.283* (0.063) -0.253** (0.044) 0.0392 (0.884)
GR_rainfall -0.00791 (0.459) 0.00393 (0.656) -0.0248** (0.029)
water_1km2 -0.000953 (0.380) -0.00165* (0.066) -0.00536*** (0.002)
Polity.IV_SH_tr -0.00189 (0.202) -0.00920*** (0.000) -0.00608** (0.035)
Accountab 0.000230 (0.790) 0.000520 (0.466) -0.00368** (0.045)
urban_pop -0.00900** (0.008) 0.00973*** (0.000) 0.0118* (0.079)
count_R_pos_shock=1 -0.00894 (0.317) -0.000504 (0.946) -0.0268 (0.111)
count_R_pos_shock=2 0.0245** (0.047) 0.00474 (0.641) -0.0734** (0.003)
count_R_pos_shock=3 -0.00757 (0.757) 0.0331 (0.102) 0.0107 (0.840)
count_R_pos_shock=4 -0.0492 (0.547) -0.0587 (0.385) -0.143** (0.013)
count_R_neg_shock=1 0.00527 (0.546) 0.00185 (0.797) 0.0140 (0.391)
count_R_neg_shock=2 0.0149 (0.238) 0.0152 (0.146) -0.0118 (0.652)
count_R_neg_shock=3 0.00940 (0.676) 0.0342* (0.066) -0.0376 (0.360)
count_R_neg_shock=4 0.0354 (0.479) 0.102** (0.013) 0.0436 (0.287)
count_R_neg_shock=5 -0.0964 (0.505) 0.216* (0.071) -0.430*** (0.000)
count_T_pos_shock=1 -0.00108 (0.918) 0.0119 (0.170) 0.0130 (0.427)
count_T_pos_shock=2 0.00996 (0.479) 0.0167 (0.151) -0.0229 (0.287)
count_T_pos_shock=3 0.0107 (0.611) 0.0334* (0.055) -0.0252 (0.634)
count_T_pos_shock=4 0.0403 (0.443) 0.0112 (0.796) -0.0281 (0.699)
count_T_pos_shock=5 0.0294 (0.786) 0.0763 (0.394) -0.0743* (0.083)
count_T_neg_shock=1 -0.0319** (0.006) 0.0174* (0.068) 0.0152 (0.544)
count_T_neg_shock=2 -0.0663*** (0.000) 0.0418*** (0.000) 0.0640* (0.062)
count_T_neg_shock=3 -0.0610*** (0.000) 0.0463*** (0.001) -0.0354 (0.379)
count_T_neg_shock=4 -0.0338 (0.172) 0.0835*** (0.000) 0.00940 (0.873)





FE and time effects yes yes yes
Constant 0.0691 (0.676) -0.456*** (0.001) 0.467*** (0.000)
Observations 1685 1685 1685
Adj R-squared 0.14 0.85
F 2.936 68.42
AIC -1799.925 -2440.702 -4641.53
p-values in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 6: Combining absolute moving climate shock variables over a previous 5-year period




GR_oil_exp_wdi 0.000000743 (0.751) -0.00000135 (0.484)
GR_trade_exports 0.118*** (0.000) -0.0119* (0.085)
agri_land 0.00476** (0.032) 0.0159*** (0.000)
arable_land -0.174 (0.279) 0.276** (0.038)
water_stress 0.0000190 (0.862) -0.000762*** (0.000)
strength_gr_polityiv -0.00727*** (0.001) 0.000810 (0.644)
GR_temp -0.410** (0.006) -0.212* (0.084) 0.105 (0.685)
GR_rainfall -0.00720 (0.489) 0.00616 (0.472) -0.0178* (0.085)
water_1km2 -0.000910 (0.401) -0.00160* (0.073) -0.00498** (0.007)
Polity.IV_SH_tr -0.00216 (0.144) -0.00924*** (0.000) -0.00578* (0.054)
Accountab 0.000553 (0.519) 0.000440 (0.534) -0.00380** (0.046)
urban_pop -0.00950** (0.005) 0.0101*** (0.000) 0.0124* (0.051)
R_count_combShok=1 -0.0209* (0.054) 0.00754 (0.401) 0.00763 (0.705)
R_count_combShok=2 0.00605 (0.603) 0.00649 (0.499) -0.0313 (0.177)
R_count_combShok=3 0.0107 (0.446) 0.0179 (0.122) -0.0382 (0.129)
R_count_combShok=4 -0.00567 (0.821) 0.0425** (0.039) -0.0130 (0.747)
R_count_combShok=5 -0.00273 (0.964) 0.0712 (0.156) -0.0603 (0.438)
T_count_combShok=1 -0.0196* (0.068) 0.0218** (0.014) 0.0121 (0.593)
T_count_combShok=2 -0.0262** (0.021) 0.0308*** (0.001) 0.0121 (0.583)
T_count_combShok=3 -0.0290** (0.032) 0.0427*** (0.000) -0.0216 (0.528)
T_count_combShok=4 -0.0234 (0.276) 0.0727*** (0.000) -0.00685 (0.885)





FE and time effects yes yes yes
Constant 0.0133 (0.935) -0.467*** (0.001) 0.502*** (0.000)
Observations 1685 1685 1685
Adj R-squared 0.13 0.85
F 2.951 72.76
AIC -1794.843 -2447.083 -4632.839
p-values in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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